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Abstract— Internet of Things (IoT) devices have conquered the 
modern world, and they are increasingly gaining ground day by day. 
Together, with their widespread use also interests from attackers in 
abusing them are rising, causing increase of malicious software 
(malware). The goal of this wrok is to introduce a detailed study of 
currently existing malware threats in IoT devices, that have arisen 
during the past years for both system hardware and software. For 
these purposes, first a detailed overview of recent security incidents 
involving IoT devices from a software viewpoint, is introduced. Then 
we present the most widespread types of malware, such as rootkits, 
ransomware and bots among others. We point out hardware 
environment with different types of side-channel attacks. Finally, we 
present existing malware detection methods and outline expected 
future directions. 
Keywords—malware; side-channel analysis; security; 
microprocessor; real-world attacks; malware detection; Internet of 
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I.INTRODUCTION 
IoT devices consist of all the cyber physical computing 
devices with internet connectivity, such as routers, web 
cameras, smartphones, point-of-sales terminals, building 
automation devices, medical equipment, smart TVs, medical 
devices, smart home devices, cars, etc. In particular, as regards 
the worldwide mobile phone market, around 1.4 billion 
smartphones were sold in 2015, according to the evaluations 
provided by the International Data Corporation (IDC) [1] [2]. 
In addition, 6.4 billion connected IoTs were reported in 2016, 
and an amount of 20.8 billion is estimated to be sold by 2020 
[1]. 
On one side, the IoT devices offer extended features, along 
with the facilitation of a wide range of functions. But on the 
other their security level is still low with well-known 
weaknesses. In [3], an extended list of vulnerabilities has been 
reported per surface area, such as software and hardware 
weaknesses, encryption issues, data privacy matters. In [4] it 
has been stated that around 1 million new threats were released 
each day during 2014. Later research, in [5], showed that 
rootkits, ransomware, bots, viruses, worms and trojan horses 
rank as the most frequent malware [6].  
Together with the threats posed to software, recent studies 
have shown that hardware threats are harmful and alarming as 
well. Technological experiments have proved the possibility of 
tampering backdoor A2, during the fabrication process [5]. 
Additionally, side-channel attacks can take place in the device’s 
physical unclonable functions (PUFs) [7]. Attacks of this kind 
aim at retrieving the secret key, which is used for data 
encryption and decryption. These attacks, are focused primarily 
on the physical implementation of a system. In addition, they 
are derived in numerous classes, the most recognized of which 
include timing attacks, power monitoring attacks, 
electromagnetic attacks, differential fault analysis, etc. 
This paper aims to provide a detailed study of the most 
common IoT security issues, and an outline of the most 
important findings reported, in recent years. Furthermore, it 
depicts a concise illustration of the most significant hardware 
attacks, focusing mainly on side-channel attacks, and more 
specifically in Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and 
Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). In conclusion, an analysis of 
different detection and protection methods is provided.  
The structure of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 
II we describe current malware in IoT devices, from both 
software and hardware perspectives. Then, in Section III we 
explore the malware detection and protection methods in detail. 
In Section IV, we provide a summary of the current situation 
and the future directions, that should be given priority 
according to the current results. Finally, Section V concludes 
the paper. 
 
II.MALWARE IN IOT DEVICES 
In this section, we analyze different types of malware that 
can affect software applications and hardware devices. With 
respect to the software area, several studies and publications 
that carried out over the last years have shown that malware 
attacks, especially in Android based applications, have risen 
dramatically. As a result, a remarkable increase has been 
reported during 2015, reaching the highest volume over the first 
quarter (Q1) [1]. As shown, in Figure 1, the emergence of new 
malware in Android devices is significantly higher (G DATA-
Mobile Malware Report 2016). During the second half of 2015 
and the first half of 2016, a 98% increase was evident in 
smartphone infection rates [8]. In this context, a new malware 
sample is detected every 9 seconds, according to security 
analysts [9]. 
 
Figure 1: Android Malware Samples Evolution 
 
On the hardware side, as studies have shown, fabrication-
time attacks, can take place by tampering the chip during its 
fabrication and by taking advantage of analog circuits [6]. 
These changes can create favorable conditions for future 
attacks. On the other hand, research has also demonstrated that 
in the case of analog hacks, a cell can be added during the chip’s 
fabrication, operating as an electric capacitor which is able to 
expose the system to an attacker [5]. Such attack is otherwise 
known as the “A2 analog attack”. 
a. MALWARE IN SOFTWARE 
Malware is the most serious threat for IoT devices, which 
can either destroy the device or, in some cases, it can shift the 
system into a privileged state under the attacker’s authority 
[10]. The most well-known malware [10] according to cyber-
attack statistics are rootkits, ransomware, bots, financial 
malware, logic bombs, virus, worms and trojans. Rootkit is a 
malware type, that the attacker can progressively access, with 
the end goal of shifting the system, under his or her authority. 
Ransomware malware can lock the user’s device or software, 
seeking monetary gain from the user to remove the current 
infection. As noted previously, “screen locker ransomware” is 
able to lock an Android-based smart TV. Designed as a self-
propagating type of malware, bots are targeted to infect a 
device. These malware threats subsequently connect to a server, 
also known as a “bot master”, which acts as a central control 
hub for compromised devices. Financial types of malware, try 
to collect banking account information from a device, or by 
means of fault banking sites. Logic bombs are code-blocks 
added by the attacker into a system. When these programmatic 
functions are triggered, they can harm the system, either by 
deleting data or by creating conditions that can destroy the 
entire system. Virus malware software is spread through a 
software program and can be harmful for a system. In order for 
a virus to be installed and replicated in a device, the user’s 
action is needed (for instance, by triggering it via an executive 
program). Contrarily to viruses, worms can be spread without 
the user’s interaction and can act independently, as a stand-
alone entity. On the other hand, worms are disseminated via the 
network. Trojans consist of a type of malware that invades a 
system by stealing user identity and information [6]. Due to 
their stand-alone attribute, such malware can enable further 
attacks by opening a backdoor. 
In a similar fashion, Grayware and Madware pose a 
considerable threat to security. Grayware, which among other 
viruses includes adware and dialers, cannot be considered as 
malicious, although they can still perform undesired actions, 
thereby negatively affecting the device’s performance. 
Madware, on the other hand, uses targeted and aggressive 
advertising messages or pop-ups, to collect information from a 
user’s device [10]. 
According to the findings in [8], three (3) of the most 
frequent threats pertaining to mobile phones are Uapush.A, 
Kasandra.B and SMSTracker. Uapush.A is a trojan which can 
steal data from a mobile device, by sending an SMS. 
Kasandra.B is another trojan, which resembles a security app. 
Kasandra.B can access sensitive data contained in a mobile 
phone like logs, credentials, history, etc. SMSTracker is an 
android app, that allows the attackers to monitor the traffic 
functions (SMS, phone calls, etc.) of a mobile device in their 
entirety. Similarly, it has been noted that a “screen locker 
ransomware” is able to lock an Android-based smart TV [8]. 
Finally, numerous IoT devices, including IP cameras, 
routers, DVRs, printers, etc., have been hacked by a malware 
named “Mirai”. It attacks IoT devices, by scanning factory-
default usernames and passwords [11]. 
b. MALWARE IN HARDWARE 
When talking about malware in hardware, attackers have 
found ways to act on the chip level, which is the integral part of 
a system. By using several methods, a device or a system, can 
be exposed. Minor modifications to a chip, might be the cause 
of numerous attacks. This paper, focuses predominately on the 
overview of the IOT software and hardware malware. However, 
it also tackles the issue of modern microprocessors, which 
consist of numerous microprograms and operations defining the 
device’s operation [12]. 
The fundamentals of hardware configurations, are 
structured by implementing strong algorithms and 
cryptographic functions. An attacker can intervene in 
operations, involving cryptographic computation values to 
retrieve the authority, by implementing various techniques. One 
of the most practical methods to compromise device security, is 
by using side channel attacks [13]. These attacks have one 
common goal, to retrieve information from the leaking signals, 
during the device’s operations. This information, coupled with 
the appropriate calculations, can lead to the retrieval of the 
secret key by the attacker. Side-channel attacks are divided into 
passive and active. Passive attacks are predominantly oriented 
towards information gathering. In this context, a passive side-
channel attack presupposes the action of gathering useful 
information during the operation process. On the other hand, 
apart from the information gathering process, active attacks are 
more dynamic, whereby an attacker can retrieve the secret keys 
by injecting faults in a normal operation. More specifically, 
during the information-gathering process of a side-channel 
attack, special equipment is used consisting of probes, 
oscilloscope, bandwidth amplifier, analyzing software, etc. 
The knowledge of the plaintext is not mandatory, during the 
differential power analysis, whereby power traces (T 1...m 
[1…k], k samples) are captured and the ciphertext is recorded 
(C [1...m]), (Figure 2). By applying the selection function and 
computing the differential trace of the k sample, the attacker 
can gain favorable results. In this vein, the differential power 
analysis can be applied in many algorithms such as AES, DES, 
etc. 
 
Figure 2: Differential Power Analysis 
 
The differential fault attack, is an attempt to modify the 
computation of an algorithm, by generating faults or by taking 
advantage of existing faults. In fact, the same data are 
encrypted, and this operation is depicted in the results. 
Furthermore, the attacker can make correlations between the 
correct and the fault ciphertext to retrieve the key candidates. 
This process can be applied many times until the unique key is 
identified. This is the case for chip cards, which are prone to 
such attack. The embedded microprocessors are sensitive in 
high temperatures, or their power supply capacity is very 
specific. All these conditions can create an ideal setting for an 
attacker. As a result, physical weaknesses may generate the 
environment of such an attack. 
In a situation, where a timing attack is performed, the 
attacker can discover the secret key, by estimating the 
processing time of a cryptographic operation. In such event, the 
attacker uses measurement instruments to compute the 
operation time. In particular, algorithms such as RSA, Diffie-
Hellman and RC5, have been reported as vulnerable to such 
attacks. 
As far as power monitoring attacks are concerned, an 
attacker can extract cryptographic keys and other information 
by monitoring the power consumption of cryptographic devices 
(integrated circuits, etc.). Power monitoring attacks are divided 
into simple and differential types, depending on the advanced 
power analysis level. Simple power analysis (SPA) is mostly 
focused on electrical activity, whereas differential power 
analysis (DPA) entails a more dynamic method. In addition to 
monitoring power traces or electrical power, an attacker can 
also retrieve values from cryptographic calculations. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, electromagnetic attacks are 
carried out by measuring the electromagnetic radiation emitted 
from a device. The attacker analyses and captures the results of 
a mined signal. The amount of radiation depends on the 
operation’s identity, which enables the attacker to capture the 
performed operation and to find the encryption keys. The RSA 
algorithm, in particular, is prone to electromagnetic attacks. 
Another frequent exploit is the differential fault analysis 
(DFA), which is known as the technique of fault injections in 
the device’s cryptographic algorithms. In other words, it is an 
attempt to modify the computation of an algorithm. These 
modifications generate ‘falsified’ output ciphertext, allowing 
thus an attacker to retrieve the key candidates with differential 
cryptanalysis techniques. Consequently, the correct key can be 
retrieved with continuous fault injections. Symmetric block 
ciphers and public key algorithms, are specifically affected by 
the DFA. 
In the previous years, Rowhammer attacks have also been 
detected in Android devices. According to researchers [14], an 
attacker can bypass the Android permission system to have full 
access of the device. As reported in experimental studies, 
disturbance errors that have been created in the row-level of a 
DRAM (Dynamic Random-Access Memory) can affect other 
memory rows as well [14]. 
Hardware trojan horses can also significantly impact a 
hardware device [6]. These, as dubbed, pertain to alterations in 
the electronic circuit of a chip during the fabrication phase [6]. 
When triggered, this malware can either create malfunction in 
the device or steal the secret key for the cryptographic 
application [15]. 
Buffer overflow and Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 
attacks have also been mentioned in recent years. For instance, 
the Belkin F9K1122 wireless range extender was affected by a 
CSRF, whereas the ZyXel NBG6716 wireless router underwent 
a buffer overflow attack [16]. 
 
III.DETECTION AND PROTECTION METHODS 
The continuous increase in malware associated with IoT 
devices has raised the need for stable and efficient detection and 
protection methods. In some cases, the numbers have shown 
that the current detection and protection methods are not 
efficient enough. Suffice to say that according to [17], 400,000 
IoT devices have been found accessible on the internet, 
including IP cameras and other devices. This means that except 
for the insufficient detection/protection methods, one of the 
most severe threat, remains people’s unawareness. The current 
malware detection methods fall into three (3) categories: 
Signature-Based Detection, Static Detection and Dynamic 
Detection [10]. 
As the most common method, Signature-Based Detection 
depends on antivirus/antimalware systems’ signatures. The 
signature is interbred via an updated malware database, 
whereby the malware is detected if the results are verified. This 
method is considered inappropriate for devices with insufficient 
memory [10]. 
Static methods are based on the device’s static 
characteristics and resources. The absence of dynamic tracking 
mechanisms, prevents the detection threats that appear at run-
time [10]. Static methods are in most cases low-resource-
consuming and lightweight [18]. Other experimental surveys 
have shown that through binary obfuscation techniques and by 
loading opaque constants into a register, a static detection tool 
cannot identify the transformed values. This experiment clearly 
identifies the 3SAT problem, providing limits in static detection 
methods when an obscure malicious code runs in a program 
[19]. 
In contrast, dynamic detection methods can detect malicious 
functionalities by pinpointing abnormal activities, such as 
network behavior, power consumption, CPU load, calls, SMS, 
virtual memory, etc. They are considered as promising due to 
their ability to detect malware at run-time and their resistance 
to malware obfuscation [10]. Finally, the best protection from 
malware can be obtained, by using both static and dynamic 
approaches, and investigating potentially malicious 
applications behavior from both aspects. 
 
IV.CURRENT SITUATION & FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Taking into consideration the continuous increase in IoT 
devices and the multidimensional threats that have arisen over 
the past years, the current situation would be described as quite 
worrisome. According to the 2016 results, 68% of the 
worldwide population uses an Android device, while 87% of 
Android users had an outdated Android version. Furthermore, 
1,723,265 new malware samples had been verified until the first 
half of 2016 [9]. 
In order to keep pace, with increased number of IoT devices 
also the detection solutions have to be improved and made more 
resistant to security threats that appear with time. However, 
having in mind the resource constrained environment of most 
of IoT devices, running complex malware detection and 
protection solutions on them is almost prohibited. This opens 
up new research challenges, on how to both effectively and 
efficiently protect these devices. One of the works that proposes 
both effective and efficient solution for runtime on-device 
mobile malware detection is presented in [18]. This work 
focuses and tests the detection performance of the proposed 
method, on the detection of malware on mobile devices, but the 
authors suggest its usage also for other resource-constrained 
devices of IoT. In the near future, we expect to see more works 
in this direction, which would focus on low-power, low-cost 
solutions for protection of IoT devices, against malware.  
As aforementioned, an attack can start from the chip’s 
fabrication level and the current functional testing techniques 
cannot ensure the security of the components. Hence, a lack of 
trust is reflected in the manufactured hardware [16]. Apart from 
developing more effective and accurate detection solutions for 
malicious software, new defenses are required related to the 
processor-level backdoors and the post fabrication testing 
methods. Moreover, further research should take place in the 
device’s physical level, with a particular emphasis on the 
physical implementation of the cryptosystem. As such, the 
defenses should start from within. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS & OUTLOOK 
Malware and its exploits, whether referring to hardware or 
software levels, remain the Achilles’ Heel in modern systems 
implementation. Since both the creation of malware and the 
attacker’s intention cannot be eliminated, it is in the best interest 
of all parties concerned to invest in technology advances related 
to secure IT environments in order to minimize threats and take 
corrective action concerning malicious attacks. In this paper, 
we introduce a detailed of the currently existing software and 
hardware malicious threats, so as of existing detection methods. 
Additionally, we present a state of the art analysis of current 
situation of the IoT security, which is followed by envisioned 
research directions in both software and hardware. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This work is supported under the framework of EU COST IC 
1204: TRUDEVICE (Trustworthy Manufacturing and 
Utilization of Secure Devices) Project. 
 
REFERENCES 
1. Symantec, “ISTR, Internet Security Threat Report”, Symantec, April 2016. 
2. IDC, www.idc.com, 2016. 
3. OWASP, www.owasp.org, 2016. 
4. V. Harrison and J. Pagliery, “CNNMoney”, CNNMoney (London), April 
2015. 
5. K. Yang, M. Hicks, Q. Dong, T. Austin and D. Sylvester, “A2: Analog 
Malicious Hardware”, 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 
(SP), San Jose, CA, USA, 2016. 
6. G. Kalogeridou, N. Sklavos, A.W. Moore, O Koufopavlou, “On the 
Hardware Trojans Detection, using Mixed-Signal ICs”, proceedings, 
workshop on Trustworthy Manufacturing and Utilization of Secure 
Devices, Conference DATE 2015, Grenoble, France, March 9-13, 2015. 
7. N. Sklavos, “Securing Communication Devices via Physical Unclonable 
Functions (PUFs)”, Information Security Solutions Europe (isse’13), 
Brussels, 22-23 October, Belgium, 2013, pp. 253-261, Springer, ISBN: 
978-3-658-03370-5. 
8. Nokia, “Nokia Threat Intelligence Report”, 2016. 
9. G DATA, “G DATA Mobile Malware Report”, G DATA, 2016. 
10. J. Milosevic, F. Regazzoni  and M. Malek, “Malware Threats and Solutions 
for Trustworthy Mobile Systems Design”, Hardware Security and Trust, 
Design and Deployment of Integrated Circuits in a Threatened 
Environment, Switzerland: Springer, 2017, pp. 149-157. 
11. Available online: www.krebsonsecurity.com, 2016. 
12. M. Katsaiti, A. Rigas, I. Tzemos, N. Sklavos, “Real-World Attacks Toward 
Circuits & Systems Design, Targeting Safety Invasion”, proceedings of the 
International Conference on Modern Circuits and Systems Technologies 
(MOCAST’15), Thessaloniki, Greece, May 14-15, 2015. 
13. A. Bechtsoudis, N. Sklavos, “Side Channel Attacks Cryptanalysis Against 
Block Ciphers Based on FPGA Devices”, proceedings of IEEE Computer 
Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (IEEE ISVLSI'10), Kefalonia, 
Greece, July 5-7, 2010. 
14. Y. Kim, R. Daly, J. Kim, C. Fallin, J. H. Lee, D. Lee, C. Wilkerson, K. Lai 
and O. Mutlu, “Flipping Bits in MemoryWithout Accessing Them: An 
Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors”, 2014. 
15. S. S. Chandra, B. N. Biswal, S. K. Udgata and J. K. Mandal, Proceedings 
of the 3rd International Conference on Frontiers of Intelligent Computing: 
Theory and Applications (FICTA) 2014: Volume 2, Springer, 2014. 
16. Available online: www.csoonline.com, 2016. 
17. SENRIO, http://blog.senr.io/, 2016. 
18. J. Milosevic, A. Ferrante and M. Malek, “MalAware: Effective and 
Efficient Run-time Mobile Malware Detector”, IEEE 14th Intl Conf on 
Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing, Lugano, Switzerland, 
2016. 
19. A. Moser, C. Kruegel and E. Kirda, “Limits of Static Analysis for Malware 
Detection”, Technical University Vienna, Vienna, 2007. 
 
